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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Although partially disabled individuals in Spain are allowed to combine the receipt of disability 
benefits with a job, the empirical evidence shows that employment rates for this group of 
individuals are very low. Therefore, in this paper we construct labor market model with search 
intensity and matching frictions in order to identify the incentives and disincentives to work 
provided by the partial disability system in Spain from the point of view of both disabled 
individuals and employers. According to the model, the high employment rate gap observed 
between nondisabled and disabled workers can be partially explained by the presence of a lower 
level of productivity and higher searching costs among disabled individuals that discourage them 
from looking for jobs. Moreover, the design of the Spanish Disability System also contributes in 
explaining this gap. We also analyze the role of business cycle conditions in shaping the labor 
market transitions of disabled individuals. 
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Partial Disability System and Labor Market Adjustment: 
The Case of Spain 
 
 
In recent years, disability policies have attracted particular attention in OECD countries 
because they represent an important source of public spending and also because societies are 
increasingly concerned about the need to strengthen the integration of people with disabilities. 
For these reasons, the possibility of increasing the number of disabled individuals who work is 
regarded as a good strategy to decrease the pressures on the financial stability of the social 
security systems as well as to achieve the social integration of people with disabilities. As the 
OECD notes, “Helping (disabled) people to work is potentially a ‘win-win’ policy: it helps 
people avoid exclusion and have higher incomes while raising the prospect of more effective 
labor supply and higher economic output in the long term” (OECD 2007). 
 The promotion of the employment of disabled individuals is particularly relevant in 
Spain, where partially disabled individuals are allowed to combine the receipt of (part) of the 
disability benefits with a job without any limit on the maximum wage or number of hours 
worked. Nonetheless, the country reported an average employment rate of just 11 percent for the 
group of people with partial disability from 2001 to 2011, which contrasts with the observed rate 
for nondisabled employees (79.9 percent). The employment rate falls to less than 6 percent when 
only considering people with disabilities in the age bracket 55–65 (which represents 45 percent 
of all the partially disabled individuals in Spain). 
 Therefore, in this paper we perform an analysis of the incentives and disincentives to 
work provided by the partial disability system in Spain from the point of view of both disabled 
individuals and employers. At the same time, we also identify the role of business cycle 
conditions in shaping the labor market transitions of disabled individuals using data for the 
2 
period 2001–2011, which includes the last expansion and recession of the Spanish economy. The 
central goal of the study is to isolate the role of the disability system in explaining the low 
employment rates of partially disabled individuals in Spain vis-à-vis their nondisabled 
counterparts. The final aim is to reach some conclusions about the types of policy initiatives that 
could be more effective in increasing both individual incentives to work as well as employers’ 
incentives to hire disabled workers. 
 To do this, we consider a search and matching model of individuals with disabilities and 
their interaction with nondisabled individuals in the search for jobs. Additionally, we also 
include in the model the hiring decisions made by companies and the incentives available in the 
legislation to hire disabled workers. We assume that, due to their disabling condition, disabled 
workers are, on average, less productive and incur higher job searching costs than nondisabled 
individuals. The presence of a productivity gap in our model is consistent with the recent 
empirical evidence presented by Malo and Pagan (2012).1 They show that between 68 and 74 
percent of the Spanish wage differential between nondisabled and disabled workers is due to the 
differences in workers characteristics, which generate a productivity gap of nondisabled workers 
with respect to their disabled counterparts. 2 In contrast, the authors show that less than 30 
percent of the wage gap between these two groups of workers can be attributed to the presence of 
discrimination.3 
                                                 
1 This paper uses the Oaxaca-Blinder wages decomposition method for Spain and other European countries. 
2 Because the authors use data from the ECHP survey, they define disabled workers as “individuals that are 
hampered in their daily activities.” 
3 In their paper, Malo and Pagan (2012) show that Spanish workers with disabilities hampered in their daily 
activities earn between 1.71 and 1.44 euros per hour less than workers who are not disabled. They also find that 
most of this wage gap is related to workers’ and jobs’ characteristics that lead to a productivity gap.  Moreover, the 
wage differences between nondisabled and disabled workers who are not hampered for their daily activities are not 
statistically significant, so that the presence of discrimination is not empirically proved. Similar results are found for 
most of the 11 European countries considered in their data. 
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 We calibrate and simulate the structural model to match a number of stylized facts 
observed in the administrative data provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration (the 
Continuous Sample of Working Lives). Our simulated model helps to understand the differences 
between disabled and nondisabled workers. More in detail, it simulates an employment rate of 
24.0 percent among disabled workers, which is much lower than the simulated one for 
nondisabled individuals (79.9 percent). The model also shows that the job finding rate for 
disabled workers is much lower and the job separation rate is higher than for nondisabled 
workers. These results are in line with the data presented in this paper.  
 The sensitivity analysis shows that both workers and firms are sensitive to the main 
policy parameters, especially for those remaining operative during the different labor market 
conditions. Thus, according to the model, part of the employment rate gap observed between 
nondisabled and disabled workers can be attributed to the design of the Spanish Disability 
System, which contributes to generate a 64 percent job search intensity gap between disabled and 
nondisabled individuals. Part of this lower search intensity can be explained by the presence of 
cost gaps in both productivity and job searching that discourage disabled workers from looking 
for jobs. However, our model also indicates the level of disability benefits for disabled workers 
increases their employment opportunity costs and, therefore, reduces their job search intensity. 
 This result is in line with the one reported by Silva and Vall-Castello (2012a), who focus 
on the employment effects of an increase in disability benefits that is granted to disabled 
individuals who turn 55. They design, calibrate, and simulate a structural labor supply model of 
job search with labor force participation decisions of individuals with disabilities. They show 
that the employment rate for disabled individuals is lower because the increase in the level of 
disability benefit generates the incentive to stay out of the labor force. However, this study only 
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reproduces the behavior of disabled individuals without including the interactions between 
disabled and nondisabled workers, and it also neglects the role of employers.  
 Our simulated model also shows that 87.0 percent of the times the firm and the disabled 
worker meet, a new employment relationship is created. This result occurs because of the policy 
incentives in place for employers to hire disabled workers. In other words, the model suggests 
that although firms are willing to hire disabled individuals, these workers look for jobs with 
much less intensity than nondisabled individuals. Moreover, since disabled workers receive 
disability benefits, they have a higher adjusted employment opportunity cost and, therefore, are 
separated from their jobs with higher frequency than nondisabled ones.  
 In terms of policy interventions, the sensitivity analysis shows that the employment rate 
gap between disabled and nondisabled workers can be considerably reduced by decreasing the 
percentage of the regulatory base received by partially disabled individuals, by increasing the 
deduction to Social Security Contributions paid by the employer, or by increasing the tax 
deduction for disabled workers. In contrast, the model shows that transitory lump-sum subsidies 
have a much lower impact in the employment rate of disabled individuals.  
 In contrast to the strong incentive to hired disabled individuals from the unemployment 
status, employers do not tend to maintain their workers in the firm when they receive the 
negative health shock and become partially disabled. According to our model, less than 10 
percent of the employees who become disabled are kept in the same firm. This result is in line 
with the low employment survival rate for new disabled employees observed in the data (17.3 
percent). It is important to emphasize that, in this case, firms do not receive a lump-sum tax if 
they keep the new disabled employee in the firm.   
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 Finally, the model shows that the employment rate, the job finding rate, and the job 
survival rate in the same firm are positively correlated with the gross domestic product (GDP). 
This result goes in line with the procyclical behavior of these rates shown by the data. 
Furthermore, the job destruction rate is negatively correlated with GDP, which is in line with its 
empirical countercyclical response. 
 Besides the aforementioned work by Silva and Vall-Castello (2012), we have found no 
literature that studies the job search process of disabled individuals. There is also no literature 
that analyzes the matching problems in the labor market for individuals with disabilities through 
the use of structural models. However, two studies analyze the labor supply behavior of 
individuals with disabilities using life-cycle models in the United States: Benitez-Silva, 
Buchinsky, and Rust (2010) and Yin and Benitez-Silva (2009). Both studies focus on the U.S. 
economy, where the disability system does not allow disabled individuals to combine the 
benefits with a job, which is very different from the Spanish system. Furthermore, these studies 
do not consider interactions with nondisabled workers or the role of employers. In our model, we 
include search intensity and matching frictions because we think that they play a central role in 
determining employment outcomes of disabled individuals. With respect to the empirical 
evidence on the labor market behavior of disabled individuals, there is an extensive literature 
analysing the U.S. system (see Autor and Duggan [2006, 2007, 2008]; Autor, Duggan, and Lyle 
[2011]; Burkhauser and Daly [2011], among others), but the literature is still very limited for the 
Spanish case (Cervini-Plá, Silva, and Vall-Castello 2012; Malo and Pagan 2012; Marie and Vall-
Castello 2012; Vall-Castello 2012).  
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections describe the specificities of the 
Spanish system of disability benefits and compare the Spanish labor market behavior for 
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partially disabled and nondisabled individuals from 2001 until 2011. The following sections 
introduce the job search and matching model and present its calibration. The paper then presents 
the steady state benchmark simulation and compares it with the data, and after that presents the 
sensitivity analysis to the policy parameters. It then looks at the business cycle behavior of the 
disabled workers. Finally, some conclusions are derived in the last section. 
MAIN FUTURES OF THE SPANISH SYSTEM OF DISABILITY BENEFITS 
 After the period of the Franco regime, the first comprehensive piece of legislation that 
was passed in Spain with respect to individuals with disabilities was the “Ley de Integración 
Social de los Minusvalidos” (LISMI), which was approved in 1982. The law included various 
aspects ranging from disability benefits as a way to economically protect disabled individuals to 
employment promotion measures to promote the labor market integration of disabled individuals. 
After this first important step, a number of small changes have been adopted during the 1990s 
and 2000s in terms of employment promotion measures to increase the incentive to work and 
hire disabled workers. 
Economic Incentives for Employers to Hire Disabled Workers 
 As shown in Table 1, currently there are three main economic incentives for employers 
that hire disabled workers. First, there is a lump-sum subsidy of 3,906.58 euros for each disabled 
worker hired (this amount is adjusted proportionally for part-time contracts). Second, employers 
can benefit from deductions to the Social Security contributions. These deductions are linked to 
the gender and the intensity of the disability of the worker. In general the deductions are 4,500 
euros per year, but they increase to 5,350 for women, to 5,700 for women above age 45, to 5,100 
for individuals with a severe disability, to 5,950 for women with a severe disability, and to 6,300 
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for women with a severe disability and age above 45. Finally, the third element that is included 
in the package of financial incentives for employers to hire disabled workers is another subsidy 
that aims to adapt the working space to the special needs that the disabled worker may have. The 
maximum amount of this subsidy is set at 902 euros and is only paid one time for each contract. 
 Furthermore, a new piece of legislation was passed in 2001 to stress the fact that all these 
measures would no longer be applied to certain contracts, such as those to family members, to 
workers who had worked in the firm in the past 24 months with a permanent contract, or to 
workers who had ended a permanent contract during the last three months. 
Table 1  Summary of the Economic Incentives for Employers 
Lump-sum subsidy 
(one for each contract) 
Deductions to the Social Security 
contributions 
Other subsidies 
3,906.58 (open to part-time contracts; 
proportional) 
4,500 euros/year 
5,350 women 
5,700 women > 45 
5,100 severe disability 
5,950 women severe disability 
6,300 women severe disability>45a 
Ask to INEM for 
subsidies to adapt the 
working spaceb up to a 
maximum of 902 euros  
NOTE: a If it is a part-time contract the deductions will be 100 percent if 75 percent of full-time work, 75 percent if she works 
between 50 and 75 percent, 50 percent if she works between 25 and 50 percent, and 25 percent if she works less than 25 percent. 
This was changed in RD2/2009: the deductions will equal the percentage worked plus 30 percent (with a 100 percent limit).  
b In 1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy was set at 901.5 euros. 
Economic Incentives for Disabled Workers 
 The disability system in Spain distinguishes between two types of permanent disability 
benefits: 1) contributory, which are given to individuals who have generally contributed to the 
Social Security system before the onset of the disabling condition; 2) and noncontributory, which 
are given to individuals who are assessed to be disabled but have never contributed to the Social 
Security system (or do not reach the minimum contributory requirement to access the 
contributory system). Noncontributory disability benefits are means-tested and managed at the 
regional level. 4  
                                                 
4 Income is evaluated yearly. The income threshold in 2010 was set at 4,755.80 euros/year for an individual 
living alone. This amount is adjusted if the individual lives with other members. 
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 The size of the noncontributory system is relatively small compared to the contributory 
system (197,126 individuals received noncontributory disability benefits in 2009, while 920,860 
received contributory benefits during the same year). The amount of benefits received is also 
smaller in the noncontributory case (the average noncontributory pension is 417.09 euros/month 
compared to an average contributory disability pension of 831.49 euros/month). Because we 
want to assess the effect of disability on wages, in the remainder of the paper we focus only on 
the permanent contributory disability system in Spain. 
 The Spanish Social Security Administration defines the permanent contributive disability 
insurance as the economic benefits to compensate the individual for losing a certain amount of 
wages or professional earnings when affected by a permanent reduction or complete loss of 
his/her working ability due to the effects of a pathologic or a traumatic process derived from an 
illness or an accident.  
 In order to capture the different situations in which a person can be after suffering from a 
disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security A In 1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy 
was set at 901.5 euros. In 1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy was set at 901.5 euros. In 
1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy was set at 901.5 euros. In 1994 the maximum amount 
of this subsidy was set at 901.5 euros. In 1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy was set at 
901.5 euros. In 1994 the maximum amount of this subsidy was set at 901.5 euros. Administration 
uses a classification of three main degrees of disability that depend on the working capacity 
lost:5 
                                                 
5 There is a fourth degree of disability benefits (permanent limited disability), but this type of benefit is 
already extinguished and it only consists of a one-time lump-sum payment.  
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1) Partial disability (57 percent of claimants): the individual is impaired to develop all or 
the fundamental tasks of his/her usual job or professional activity, but he/she is still 
capable of developing a different job or professional activity. 
2) Total disability (40 percent of claimants): the individual is impaired for the development 
of any kind of job or professional activity. 
3) Severe disability (3 percent of claimants): individuals who, as a result of anatomic or 
functional losses, need the assistance of a third person to develop essential activities of 
daily living, such as eating or moving. 
 The eligibility requirements and the pension amount depend on the source of the 
disability (ordinary illness, work-related or unrelated accident, or occupational illness); the level 
of the disability; and the age of the onset of the disabling condition. Table 2 summarizes the 
main parameters of both the eligibility criteria and the pension formula. With respect to 
eligibility, the number of years of contributions required depends on the age of the onset of the 
disabled condition for common illness, while there are no contributory requirements if the health 
impairment is due to either an accident or an occupational illness.   
 The total amount of the pension is obtained by multiplying a percentage, which varies 
depending on the type of pension and the degree of disability (as shown in the last rows of Table 
2) to the regulatory base, which depends on the source of the disability and on previous salaries.6 
The percentage is 55 percent or 75 percent for partial disability beneficiaries, 100 percent for 
total disability and 150 percent for severe disability. Partial disability beneficiaries receive 55 
percent of the regulatory base but this percentage can be increased to 75 percent for individuals 
who are older than 55 and have difficulties finding a job due to lack of education or 
characteristics of the social and labor market of the region where they live. 
                                                 
6 Benefit = Regulatory base × Percentage. 
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 The number of years included in the regulatory base depends on the source of the 
disability; for common illness the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 112 the wage in 
the last 96 months (8 years) before becoming disabled. When the source of the disability is an 
accident unrelated to work, the regulatory base is calculated by dividing by 28 the wage in the 
last 24 months before becoming disabled. The individual can choose these 24 months from the 
last 7 years of work. For a work-related accident or professional illness, the regulatory base is 
calculated by dividing by 12 the wage in the last 365 days before becoming disabled.7 
 With respect to the taxes that disabled individuals have to pay, we can see in Table 3 that 
individuals with a total disability benefit are exempt from paying income taxes. On the contrary, 
partially disabled workers are required to pay income taxes (they are only exempt if the 
individual resides in the Basc country and the partially disabled worker does not have a job). 
However, there is a reduction in the employment income used to calculate the income tax for 
partially disabled workers. This reduction is 2,800 euros per year if the disability level is 
between 33 and 65 percent and 6,200 euros per year if the disability level is more than 65 
percent (or if the individual has reduced mobility).  
 Because the aim of the paper is to analyze the incentives and disincentives to work 
provided by the disability system in Spain, we focus only on the group of partially disabled 
individuals, as they have been assessed to keep certain capacity to work by the Social Security 
medical team (in a professional activity that is different from the one developed before the onset 
of the disability). We do not include in our sample individuals with a total or a severe disability 
                                                 
7 There was a reform in the calculation of the level of disability benefits for ordinary illness introduced in 
2008. After the reform, there was a percentage that depended on the number of years contributed to the system that 
was multiplied by the regulatory base. We do not model this legislative change in this paper, and we include the pre-
reform system in our model. However, to see the effect of this change on the inflow into the disability system, see 
Silva and Vall-Castello (2012b). 
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because they are supposed to be impaired for the development of any kind of job or professional 
activity. 
Table 2  Summary of the Parameters to Calculate Permanent Disability Pensions 
 Ordinary illness 
Accident unrelated to 
work 
Work-related accident or 
professional illness 
Eligibility 
Age >= 31: 
Contributed 1/4 time between 20 
years old and disabling condition. 
Minimum of 5 years. No minimum 
contributory period 
required. 
No minimum 
contributory period 
required. 
Age < 30:  
Contributed 1/3 time between 16 
years old and disabling condition. 
No minimum number of years 
required. 
Regulatory base Average wage last 8 years of work. 
Average annual wage of 
24 months within the last 
7 years of work. 
Average wage last year 
of work. 
Percentage applied to 
the regulatory base 
Partial disability: 55 percent. 
Individuals older than 55 with difficulties to find a job due to lack of education or 
characteristics of the social and labor market of the region where they live: 75 percent. 
Total disability: 100 percent. 
Severe disability: 100 percent + 50 percent. 
 
 
Table 3  Summary of the Fiscal Measures for Individuals Receiving Disability Benefits 
 Partially disabled individuals Totally disabled individuals 
Income taxes Pay normal income taxes. Exempt if Basca country and no job. 
Exempt from income taxes. 
Reduction in 
employment 
income used to 
calculate the 
income tax 
2,800 euros/year (if disability level between 33 percent 
and 65 percent) if working. 
6,200 euros (if disability more than 65 percent or below 
that but disabled with reduced mobility) if working. 
NOTE: a Disabled individuals in the provinces of Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa, which constitute the Basc country, are 
exempt from paying income taxes on total disability pensions if they don’t work. 
DATABASE 
 The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales, [MCVL]), which is a microeconomic data set based on administrative records 
provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random sample of 4 
percent of all the individuals who, at some point during 2010, had contributed to the Social 
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Security system (either by working or being on an unemployment scheme) or had received a 
contributory benefit. The random sample selected contains over 1 million people. 
 There is information available on the entire employment and pension history of the 
workers, including the exact duration of employment, unemployment, and disability pension 
spells, and for each spell, several variables that describe the characteristics of the job or the 
unemployment/disability benefits. There is also some information on personal characteristics 
such as age, gender, nationality, and level of education. The macroeconomic variables used to 
capture the economic business cycle are derived from the Spanish “Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica.” 
 For the sample of disabled workers we select an inflow sample of all individuals that 
started receiving partial disability benefits between 2001 and 2010, and we follow their labor 
market transitions until 2010 or until they reach age 65, and they are automatically transferred to 
the old-age pension system. For the sample of nondisabled individuals we select a 30 percent 
random sample of all individuals that have never received (and never will receive) a disability 
pension, and we follow their transitions in the labor market from 2001 to 2010. For both 
samples, we consider an individual as employed if they are observed as working on December 
15th.8  
EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSITION RATES IN THE SPANISH LABOR MARKET 
FOR DISABLED AND NONDISABLED WORKERS 
 In this section we present a set of indicators that compare the Spanish labor market 
behavior for partially disabled (d) and nondisabled (n) individuals from 2001 until 2011. Figure 
                                                 
8  We have also worked with a different definition of employment and the results do not change 
substantially. We have decided to use the December 15th definition because it proved to be the definition with a 
lower irregular component. 
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1 shows the annual employment rates of these two types of individuals, as a proportion of the 
working-age population. The first noteworthy result is the presence of an important employment 
gap between nondisabled and partially disabled workers during the whole period. More in detail, 
while the employment rate of nondisabled employees fluctuates between 78.2 percent and 82.3 
percent, the corresponding rate of partially disabled employees moves between 8.1 percent and 
13.3 percent. Both employment rates show a somewhat similar trend, increasing between 2001 
and 2007 and decreasing during the current downturn.  
 
Figure 1  Spanish Employment Rates for Disabled and Nondisabled Workers (2001–2011) 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration from the MCVL. 
 
 
 We also analyze the ins and outs of employment by considering measures of separation 
and job ﬁnding rates derived from the MCVL. Let 𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑖  and 𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑖  denote the gross ﬂows from 
employment to nonemployment and from nonemployment to employment with i=d,n, 
respectively, and let 𝑒𝑡−1𝑖  and 𝑢𝑡−1𝑖  indicate the measured stocks of employed and nonemployed 
workers in year t − 1, respectively. Then, the annual separation and job ﬁnding rates are 
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determined by 𝜓𝑡𝑖 = 𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑡−1𝑖  and 𝑓𝑡𝑖 = 𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑡−1𝑖 . Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of the job finding and 
job separation rates for both disabled and nondisabled workers.  
 As can be observed in Figure 2, the job finding rate for the nondisabled is much higher 
than that for disabled people. On average, the job finding rate for the former is 10 times higher 
(0.329 and 0.033, respectively). In addition, both rates display similar behavior during the 
period, showing a correlation coefficient of 0.70. In turn, Figure 3 shows that the job separation 
rate of disabled workers is 2.5 times higher than that for nondisabled workers (0.215 vs. 0.092, 
on average). Moreover, both rates are positively correlated, displaying a correlation coefficient 
of 0.55.    
 
Figure 2  Job Finding Rates for Disabled and Nondisabled Workers (2001–2011) 
 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration from the MCVL. 
 
 
 Summarizing, we find that the job finding rate for disabled workers is much lower than 
for nondisabled workers, while the job separation rate is higher. These results imply that 
nonemployment spells for the disabled are much larger while, at the same time, these workers 
lose or separate from their jobs with higher frequency.  
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Figure 3  Job Separation Rates for Disabled and Nondisabled Workers (2001–2011)  
 
SOURCE: Authors’ elaboration from the MCVL. 
 
 
 As we have seen above, the Spanish system allows partially disabled individuals to work 
while receiving disability benefits. According to the law, however, partially disabled individuals 
cannot work in the same job position when becoming disabled, although they are still capable of 
doing a different activity. Therefore, once the individual becomes disabled, either the firm can 
reallocate these workers in a different job position inside the firm or the new disabled individual 
has to change his current job and search for a job in another firm. According to Figure 4, less 
than 20 percent of the nondisabled employees who become partially disabled continue working 
in the same firm just after the disabling condition (17.3 percent, in average). This survival rate, 
𝜚𝑒,𝑡𝑑 , is determined by the ratio between the new disabled individuals who remain employed in 
the same firm, et−1𝑛 et𝑑, and the total flow of new disabled individuals, �et−1𝑛 et𝑑 + et−1𝑛 𝑢t𝑑�.   
 Therefore, using these transition rates that we have empirically obtained from the Spanish 
Social Security database, in the next sections we present and simulate a model with matching 
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Figure 4  Survival Employment Rate for New Disabled Employees (2001–2011) 
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frictions and search intensity that includes the main aspects of the Spanish Disability System in 
order to explain the labor market differences between disabled and nondisabled workers.  
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely lived firms, and 
individuals who discount future payoffs at a common rate, β. We normalize the population to 1. 
Moreover, capital markets are perfect and time is discrete.  
 Individuals may be either nondisabled (n) or partially disabled (d). A partially disabled 
individual receives a pension equivalent to a proportion, 𝛼, of their average wage for the years 
previous to the accident or illness, w0d. A nondisabled individual can be converted into partially 
disabled with exogenous probability, 𝜋(the health shock). In turn, a partially disabled individual 
exits from the labor market with exogenous probability, 𝜌. 
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 According to the Spanish disability system, an individual with partial disability cannot 
develop all of the fundamental tasks of his usual job, but he is still capable of developing a 
different job or professional activity. We assume that the firm can decide to offer him a 
reallocation in a different professional activity. If there is not reallocation inside the firm, the 
new disabled individual has to search for a new one.  
 Both partially disabled and nondisabled individuals can either be employed or 
unemployed. All workers compete in the labor market for the same jobs. Unemployed 
individuals enjoy an instantaneous utility 𝑏 each period. This employment opportunity cost has 
to be given up when the worker finds a job. Following Pissarides (2000), unemployed workers 
have search intensity. Let 𝑠𝑡
𝑗with j = n,d be a variable measuring the intensity of search by each 
type of unemployed workers. Unemployed workers incur in convex job search costs, b�𝑠𝑡
𝑗�
𝜛
, 
expressed in terms of the employment opportunity costs, 𝑏. It is more difficult for a person with 
a partial disability to look for jobs than it is for a person without one. Thus, we assume that the 
search costs for disabled individuals are proportional to the level of disability, 𝑑𝑖𝑠.  
 Each period, any job position may be endogenously terminated. Exogenous separations 
may also occur with probability 𝜑 for any type of worker. When an employment relationship is 
broken, the worker becomes unemployed. 
 Each firm consists of one job that is either filled or vacant and uses only labor as input. 
Before a position is filled, the firm has to open a job vacancy with cost c per period. A firm’s 
output depends on aggregate productivity 𝐴𝑡, a match-specific term 𝑧𝑡, and the worker’s type. In 
particular, a job filled with nondisabled workers produces 𝐴𝑡𝑧𝑡, whereas with a partial disability 
in continuing jobs produces (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠)𝐴𝑡𝑧𝑡 , where (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠)  is the “permanent” productivity 
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gap between disabled and nondisabled individuals. 9 Following Cervini-Plá, Silva, and Vall-
Castello (2012), we also assume that the productivity gap in new job positions includes a 
temporary component, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡, which is related to the assimilation costs of working in a different 
job or professional activity. This temporary gap component disappears after a certain period 
spent working in the new job.  
 The match-specific productivity term 𝑧𝑡  is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed across firms and time, with a cumulative distribution function G(z) and support [0, 𝑧̅]. 
We also assume that 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑡) follows a Markovian stochastic process, while the idiosyncratic 
productivity z is assumed to be log-normally distributed with normalized mean (𝜇) and standard 
deviation (𝜎).  
 Employers receive a one-time lump-sum subsidy 𝜁𝑒when they maintain a new disabled 
individual in the firm or 𝜁𝑢 if they hire an unemployed disabled worker. Firms also receive an 
annual deduction of 𝜉 to Social Security contributions for each disabled worker. In turn, firms 
incur extra hiring costs when they hire a new disabled worker. For example, they need to provide 
adapting working space costs so that workers with disabilities can do their jobs, and they have to 
take into account the extra time that supervisors or coworkers will need to spend to assist 
workers with disabilities. We assume that these net entry costs, 𝜏, are incurred during the first 
year of the employment relationship. Finally, employed individuals earn a wage net of taxes, 𝑤𝑡
𝑗, 
and disabled workers receive a net income tax deduction, 𝑝, when they are working. 
 There is a time-consuming and costly process of matching unemployed workers and job 
vacancies. As in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume that the meeting function 
takes the following form: 
                                                 
9 As we mentioned in the beginning of the paper, the presence of a productivity gap in our model is 
consistent with the recent empirical evidence presented by Malo and Pagan (2012).  
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where 𝑢𝑡  denotes the unemployment rate, 𝑣𝑡  are vacancies, and 𝑠𝑡  defines the average job 
searching intensity. Each period an unemployed individual meets a firm with probability Since 
there is not search intensity for firms, they meet an unemployed worker 
with probability 
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t
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 We assume that there is free entry for firms. Hence firms open vacancies until the 
expected value of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium the value of a vacancy, 𝑉𝑡, is 
equal to zero: 
 
(2) 𝑉𝑡 = 0.  
 
 To describe the firms’ behavior, let us define the Bellman equations characterizing the 
value of the filled position for a nondisabled worker, 𝐽𝑡𝑛(𝑧𝑡), the new job position for disabled 
worker remaining in the same firm, 𝐽𝑒,𝑡𝑑 (𝑧𝑡), the new disabled position for a worker coming from 
the unemployment status,  𝐽𝑢,𝑡𝑑 (𝑧𝑡), and the position for a disabled employee in a continuing job, 
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𝑑(𝑧𝑡).   
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where 𝐸𝑡 is the expectation operators and ?̃? 𝑛, ?̃?𝑢𝑑 , ?̃?𝑒𝑑 and ?̃? 𝑑 are productivity thresholds defined 
such that nonprofitable matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed. 
 According to Equation (3), each period, those nondisabled employees who receive a 
health shock, 𝜋, have the possibility of being reallocated to a different job position inside the 
firm. If the firm reallocates the worker it receives the lump-sum subsidy, 𝜁𝑒  (see Equation [5]). In 
case of disagreement, the firm opens a new vacancy that may be filled by either a disabled or a 
nondisabled worker. If an unemployed disabled worker fills the new vacancy, the firms will 
receive a lump-sum subsidy, 𝜁𝑢  (Equation [4]). In both cases, the firm only gets the subsidy 
during the first period of the new employment relationship and incurs adjustment costs, 𝜏. As 
Equation (6) shows, continuing disabled job positions do not receive the lump-sum subsidy but 
still receive the deduction 𝜉 to Social Security contributions.  
 New hires are determined according to the expected value of a contact with an 
unemployed worker. This value is the average of the expected hiring values of disabled and 
nondisabled unemployed workers. Thus, it depends on the effective searching share of disabled 
and nondisabled individuals looking for jobs, 𝛿𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑢𝑡𝑛
𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑡
. The average expected value of a new 
filled position is equal to 
 
(7) 𝑐
𝑞𝑡
= 𝛽𝐸𝑡 �𝛿𝑡𝑛 ∫ 𝐽𝑡+1𝑛 (𝑧)?̅?𝑧�𝑡+1𝑛 𝑑𝐺(𝑧) + 𝛿𝑡𝑑 ∫ 𝐽𝑢,𝑡+1𝑑 (𝑧)𝑑𝐺(𝑧)?̅?𝑧�𝑢,𝑡+1𝑑 �  
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 According to Equation (7), in equilibrium the average expected value of a new filled 
position is equal to the hiring costs, 𝑐
𝑞𝑡
. The conditions defining the thresholds for job creation 
and destruction are 
 
(8) 𝐽𝑡𝑛(?̃?𝑡𝑛) = 0, 
 
 
(9) 𝐽𝑒,𝑡𝑑 �?̃?𝑒,𝑡𝑑 � = 0, 
 
 
(10) 𝐽𝑢,𝑡𝑑 �?̃?𝑢,𝑡𝑑 � = 0,  
 
 
(11) 𝐽𝑡𝑑�?̃?𝑡𝑑� = 0. 
 
 The first expression, (8), captures both the job creation and job destruction condition for a 
nondisabled individual. Expression (9) is the job reallocation condition for the disabled worker 
who remains in the same firm. In turn, expression (10) is the job creation condition for a disabled 
worker coming from the unemployment status, u. Finally, expression (11) is the job separation 
condition for each disabled employee in a continuing job position. 
 From the worker’s perspective, the values of being unemployed 𝑈𝑡
𝑗 , employed and 
𝑊𝑡
𝑗(𝑧𝑡) are 
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 When a health shock hits a nondisabled worker, he receives disability benefits, 𝛼𝑗w0d, 
regardless of the labor market status. However, according to Equations (13) and (15)−(17), the 
disability scheme for an unemployed worker, 𝛼𝑢, can be different with respect to the one for the 
employment status, 𝛼𝑑. More in detail, according to the Spanish Disability System, the amount 
of pension received varies according to the disability degree in which the individual is classified. 
Individuals in the partial disability scheme receive, in general, 55 percent of the regulatory base 
(which is an average of the last salaries). This 55 percent can be increased to 75 percent for 
individuals aged 55 conditionally of being unemployed. Moreover, Equations (15)–(17) show 
that if the partially disabled individual works, he receives a net reduction of 𝑝  in the 
employment income used to calculate the income tax.  
 Unemployed nondisabled and disabled workers find jobs with the following probabilities: 
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(18) ( )1 (1 ) 1n n nt t tf G zπ λ + = − −   
 
 
(19) ( ) ( ), 1 1 1d d dt t u tf G zρ λ + = − −   
 
 
Moreover, it follows that nondisabled and disabled workers separate from employment to 
unemployment with probabilities 
 
(20) ( ) ( ) ( )11  1  n nt tG zψ π ϕ ϕ + = − + −   
 
 
(20) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1  d dt tG zψ ρ ϕ ϕ + = − + −   
 
 
 In turn, the reallocation and nonreallocation rates for new disabled employees are 
 
(22) ( ) ( ), , 11 1d de t e tG zχ ρ π + = − −   
 
 
(23) ( ) ( ), , 11d du t e tG zχ ρ π += −   
 
 
Notice that the survival rate inside the firm for new disabled workers is just 𝜚𝑒,𝑡𝑑 = �1 −
𝐺�?̃?𝑒,𝑡+1𝑑 ��.  
 Neither workers nor employers can instantaneously find an alternative match partner in 
the labor market, and because hiring and firing decisions are costly, a match surplus exists. To 
divide this surplus we assume wages to be the result of bilateral Nash bargaining between 
workers and firms. They are revised every period upon the occurrence of new shocks, and the 
Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the workers’ and the firms’ net 
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return from the job matches. The first-order conditions for the disabled and nondisabled 
employees yield the following four equations: 
 
(24) ( ) ( ) ( )1 n n nt t t t tW z U J zη η − − =   
 
 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,1 d d du t t t u t tW z U J zη η − − =   
 
 
(26) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,1 d d de t t t e t tW z U J zη η − − =   
 
 
(27) ( ) ( ) ( )1 d d dt t t t tW z U J zη η − − =   
 
where η ∈ (0,1) denotes workers’ bargaining power relative to firms.  
 Finally, each type of unemployed worker chooses search intensity 𝑠𝑡
𝑗  to maximize the 
present-discounted value of their expected income 𝑈𝑡
𝑗  during the search process, taking the other 
market variables as given. Each optimal 𝑠𝑡
𝑗 satisfies 
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 To fully characterize the dynamics of this economy, we need to define the law of motion 
for unemployment and employed workers (𝑢𝑡
𝑗 and 𝑒𝑡
𝑗). These evolve according to the following 
difference equations: 
 
(30) 𝑒𝑡𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 + 𝑓𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜓𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜒𝑒,𝑡𝑑 𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜒𝑢,𝑡𝑑 𝑒𝑡−1𝑛  
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(31) 𝑒𝑡𝑑 = 𝑒𝑡−1𝑑 + 𝑓𝑡𝑑𝑢𝑡−1𝑑 − 𝜓𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑡−1𝑑 + 𝜒𝑒,𝑡𝑑 𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜌𝑒𝑡−1𝑑  
 
 
(32) 𝑢𝑡𝑛 = 𝑢𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝑓𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑡−1𝑛 + 𝜓𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜋𝑢𝑡−1𝑛   
 
 
(33) 𝑢𝑡𝑑 = 𝑢𝑡−1𝑑 − 𝑓𝑡𝑑𝑢𝑡−1𝑑 + 𝜓𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑡−1𝑑 + 𝜋𝑢𝑡−1𝑛 +𝜒𝑢,𝑡𝑑 𝑒𝑡−1𝑛 − 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1𝑑   
 
 
(34) 𝑒𝑡𝑛 + 𝑒𝑡𝑑 + 𝑢𝑡𝑛 + 𝑢𝑡𝑑 = 1  
 
 
(35) 𝑢𝑡𝑛 + 𝑢𝑡𝑑 = 𝑢𝑡  
 
 
(36) 𝑒𝑡𝑛 + 𝑒𝑡𝑑 = 𝑒𝑡 (36) 
 
CALIBRATION 
 We calibrate the model in the steady state at annual frequency to be consistent with 
certain empirical Spanish labor market facts. In particular, the parameterization must match the 
main labor market characteristics of nondisabled individuals between 2001 and 2011:  
1) A job separation rate of 9.2 percent, so 𝜓𝑛 = 0.092.  
2) A job finding rate of 28.4 percent, 𝑓𝑛 = 0.284.  
3) the 93.2 percent average proportion of nondisabled workers in the labor force, 
𝑒𝑛+𝑢𝑛
𝑢+𝑒
= 0.932  
4) A relative number of nondisabled workers looking for jobs of  𝑢
𝑛
𝑢
= 0.783.  
5) Following Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2011), the hiring costs parameter is calibrated 
to match a quarterly hiring costs equivalent to 3 percent of nondisabled wages, 
𝑐
𝑤𝑛
= 0.12
4
.  
6) Cervini-Plá, Silva, and Vall-Castello (2012) estimate an average wage gap of 21 
percent between a disabled and nondisabled individual, 𝑤
𝑛
𝑤𝑑
= 1.21. 
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7) Based on Castillo, Jimeno, and Licandro (1998), the calibration also must match our  
 
target elasticity, 𝜀𝑢, of 0.80 in the matching function with respect to unemployment.  
 We normalized the aggregate labor productivity to one, 𝐴 = 1. We fix the discount factor 
at β = 0.96, which implies a reasonable interest rate of nearly 4 percent. We also set the 
bargaining parameter η to 0.5. Using the definition of partial disability, we assume that partial 
disability represents a reduction of between 33 percent and 65 percent of the working ability and 
set the permanent disability gap at dis = 0.50. From the Spanish database, the transition rate from 
nondisability to partial disability is set at 0.14 percent, 𝜋 = 0.0014. In turn, Cervini-Plá, Silva, 
and Vall-Castello (2012) calculate that the transitory component of the wage gap represents 6 
percent of the wage of a disabled worker. Thus, we set the transitory disability gap, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡, to 
match this target, 𝑤𝑑
𝑤𝑢
𝑑 = 1.06.      
 Individuals above 55 years of age in the partial disability scheme receive 75 percent of 
the regulatory base if they do not work and 55 percent if they work (which is an average of the 
last eight years of salaries). As in Silva and Vall-Castello (2012a), we assume that individuals 
are below 55 years old. Thus, we set 𝛼𝑢 = 𝛼𝑑 =  0.55.  
 The average wage net of tax for a partially disabled worker is 14,168 euros/year.10 If the 
individual works, he receives an income deduction net of taxes of 420 euros/year in the 
employment income if the disability level is between 33 percent and 65 percent.11 This amount 
represents around 3 percent of the average wage for disabled workers. In turn, the average 
regulatory base is 10,716 euros/year, which represents 0.76 times the average net wage of a 
partially disabled worker. Thus, we calibrate 𝑤0𝑑 and 𝑝 to match these two targets.  
                                                 
10According to Cervini-Plá, Silva, and Vall-Castello (2012), the gross average wage is 16,668. Using the 
OECD Tax Database, we calculate an average income tax of 15 percent.  
11Multiplying the income tax deduction of 2,800 by the tax rate of 0.15 we obtain 420 euros/year.  
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 In turn, firms receive a lump-sum subsidy of 3,900 euros when hiring an unemployed 
disabled individual, which represents around 28 percent of the average annual net wage of a 
disabled worker. Thus, we set 𝜁𝑢 to match this target. Since 2001, this subsidy cannot be applied 
to workers that had worked in the firm in the past 24 months or to workers that had ended a 
contract during the last 3 months. We assume that 𝜁𝑒 = 0. 
 Firms also receive 4,500 euros/year, which accounts for reduction to the Social Security 
contributions. This magnitude represents 32 percent of the net wage for a disabled individual. As 
before, we set 𝜉 to match this target. The logarithm of the idiosyncratic productivity z is assumed 
to be N (µ=0, σ=0.2).   
 Finally, the parameter of the searching costs, 𝜛, the matching function parameter, 𝜗, the 
exogenous separation probability, 𝜑,  the transitory disability gap, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 , the employment 
opportunity cost, b, the vacancy costs parameter, c, income deduction, 𝑝, the exit rate from the 
labor market for disabled individuals, 𝜌, the lump-sum subsidy for hiring a disabled worker 
𝜁𝑢 ,  the firm’s deduction to the Social Security contributions, 𝜉 , the firm’s adjustment costs, 
𝜏,and the regulatory base parameter, 𝑤0𝑑, are calibrated to match our 12 targets. Table 4 resumes 
the targets and the calibrated parameters in the economy. 
 
Table 4  Annual Calibrated Parameters for the Average Spanish Labor Market, 2001–2011 
Parameters Value Definition  
A 1 Normalization of aggregate labor productivity 
β  0.96 Discount factor 
wσ  0.20 Standard deviation for the distribution of log(A) 
µ 0.00 Mean of the distribution of log(A) 
b  0.779 The employment opportunity cost 
𝜗 0.630 Matching function elasticity  
𝜑 0.083  Exogenous job exit probability.  
ρ  0.019 Exit rate from the labor market for disabled individuals 
c 0.029 Vacancy costs  
p 0.023  The income deduction for disabled workers 
𝜁𝑢 0.22 The firm’s lump-sum subsidy for hiring an unemployed worker with disability 
Table 4  (Continued) 
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Parameters Value Definition  
𝜁𝑒  0.0 The firm’s lump-sum subsidy for hiring an employed worker with disability 
𝛼𝑢 0.55  Partial disability scheme for unemployment  
𝛼𝑑  0.55 Partial disability scheme for employment w0d 0.61 Regulatory base for disability 
dis  0.50 Permanant degree of disability 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡  0.076 Transitory degree of disability 
𝜛 3.7 Searching costs  
η 0.552 Workers’ bargaining power 
𝜋 0.0014 Transition from nondisability to partial disability 
𝜉 0.25 Firm’s deduction to Social Security contribution 
𝜏 0.120 Creation costs for new disabled positions 
Targets     
𝑓𝑛 0.329  Nondisabled job finding rate 
𝜓𝑡
𝑑 0.083 Nondisabled job separation rate 
𝑢𝑛
𝑢
 0.783 The relative number of nondisabled unemployed workers  
𝑒𝑛 + 𝑢𝑛
𝑢 + 𝑒  0.932 Average proportion of nondisabled workers in the labor force 
𝑐
𝑤𝑛
 0.03 Vacancy costs ratio 
𝑤𝑛
𝑤𝑑
 
1.21 Average wage gap between disabled and nondisabled workers 
𝑝
𝑤𝑑
 0.030 Worker’s subsidy ratio for disabled individuals w0d
𝑤𝑑
 
1.35 Regulatory base ratio for disabled individuals 
𝜁𝑢
𝑤𝑑
 
0.28 The firms lump-sum subsidy ratio 
𝜉
𝑤𝑑
 
0.32 Firm’s ratio of deduction to Social Security contribution 
𝜀𝑢 0.81 Elasticity of the matching function 
𝑤𝑑
𝑤𝑢𝑑
 
1.06 Transitory disability gap 
 
STEADY STATE SIMULATED RESULTS 
 Table 5 shows the benchmark simulation of the model in the steady state and compares it 
with average values observed in the Spanish labor market between 2001 and 2011. The 
simulation shows an employment rate of 24.0 percent among disabled workers, which is much 
lower than the observed one for nondisabled individuals (79.9 percent). It also shows that the job 
finding rate for disabled workers (0.101) is significantly lower than the observed one for 
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nondisabled individuals (0.329). The lower average job finding rate of disabled workers is due to 
their search intensity rate of 0.167, which is much lower than the job search intensity rate of 
nondisabled workers (0.465).  
 The simulation also shows that 87.0 percent of the times the firm and the disabled 
unemployed worker meet, a new employed relationship is created [𝐺�?̃?𝑢,𝑡+1𝑑 � = 0.130]. In other 
words, the model suggests that although firms are willing to hire disabled unemployed 
individuals, these workers look for jobs with much less intensity than nondisabled individuals. 
While part of this behavior is related to the presence of both a productivity gap and higher job 
searching costs that discourage these types of workers from looking for jobs, our model also 
indicates that the receipt of the disability benefits increase the employment opportunity cost and 
therefore reduce their job search intensity. 
 With respect to the firms’ side, although the lump-sum subsidy generates the incentive to 
hire new disabled workers this incentive is reduced once the subsidy disappears in the next 
period. More in detail, Table 5 shows that the simulated job destruction rate for continuing job 
disability contracts, 𝜓𝑑 , amounts to 0.311, which is higher than the job destruction rate of 
nondisabled employees (0.083). Similarly, the model shows that less than 10 percent of the 
employees who become disabled are kept in the same firm after the disabling condition. That is, 
the employment survival rate for new disabled employees is 𝜚𝑒,𝑡𝑑 = 0.085. As explained above, 
this low survival rate can be explained by the fact that firms do not receive a lump-sum subsidy 
if they decide to keep the new disabled employee working in the firm.   
 Finally, although the model can help to explain the differences between disabled and 
nondisabled workers, notice that it overestimates most of the average transition rates for the 
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latest group of workers observed in the data, except for the case of the job survival rate for new 
disabled individuals, which is lower than the observed one, 𝜚𝑒,𝑡𝑑 . 
 
Table 5  Steady State Simulated Results for the Spanish Labor Market Average (2001–2011)  
Simulated results  Simulated results Data 
Nondisabled employment rate 𝑒𝑟𝑛 0.799 0.799 
Disabled employment rate 𝑒𝑟𝑑 0.240 0.114 
Nondisabled Job separation rate 𝜓𝑛 0.083 0.083 
Disabled job separation rate 𝜓𝑑 0.311 0.215 
Unsuccessful job meeting rate 𝐺(?̃?𝑢𝑑) 0.130 — 
Nondisabled job finding rate 𝑓𝑛 0.329 0.329 
Disabled job finding rate 𝑓𝑑 0.101 0.033 
Employment survival rate for new disabled  𝜚𝑒𝑑 0.085 0.173 
Job search intensity for nondisabled 𝑠𝑛 0.465 — 
Job search intensity for disabled 𝑠𝑑 0.167 — 
Wage ratio n
d
w
w
 1.211 1.210 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR THE LEVEL OF DISABILITY AND POLICY 
PARAMETERS 
 In this section, we present the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the main 
parameters related to the Spanish Disability System. We modify some of the relevant parameters 
and compare the simulated results with the benchmark simulation in Table 5. In each exercise, 
we only modify one of the model’s parameters and keep the rest unchanged. We believe that this 
exercise allows us to compare the sensitivity of each of the parameters included in the model and 
to assess the relative importance of each of them in explaining the labor market behavior of 
disabled workers.  
 The first row of Table 6 shows that when the degree of the permanent disability increases 
one percentage point from 50 percent to 51 percent, the employment rates falls from 24.0 percent 
to 17.4 percent. According to the model, a higher level of disability reduces the worker’s 
productivity and increases the job search costs for disabled individuals. As a result, the job 
destruction rate increases from 0.311 to 0.392, while the job finding rate falls from 0.101 to 
 31 
0.085. In the latest case, the decrease in 𝑓𝑑 is due in part to a reduction in the job search intensity 
of disabled workers—from 0.167 to 0.155. Moreover, the model shows that 21.0 percent of the 
meetings between the firm and the worker do not finish in a new employment relationship. This 
simulated scenario also shows that the job survival rate in the firm for new disabled individuals 
falls from 8.5 percent to 5.3 percent.   
 With respect to the policy parameters that involve the worker’s side of the model, we 
observe that when the proportion of the disability benefits for unemployed workers, 𝛼𝑢 , is 
increased from 55 percent to 56 percent, the employment rate falls to 19.9 percent, increasing the 
employment rate gap. In this case, the model says that workers have less incentive to look for 
jobs and decide to reduce their search intensity, which in turn reduces the job finding rate to 
0.093. The lower search intensity also increases their adjusted employment opportunity costs 
and, therefore, the job meeting rejection rate from 13.0 percent to 17.8 percent, 𝐺(?̃?𝑢𝑑) = 0.178. 
Moreover, with higher employment opportunity costs, firms have less incentive to maintain these 
types of workers, so the job destruction rate jumps to 0.359.  
 
Table 6  Simulated Results for the Sensitivity Analysis 
Scenario 𝑒𝑟𝑑 
𝑒𝑟
𝑛 − 𝑒𝑟
𝑑 
Employment 
gap 𝑓𝑑 
𝑓𝑛 − 𝑓𝑑 
Job 
finding 
gap 𝜓𝑑 
𝜓𝑛 − 𝜓𝑑  
Job 
destruction 
gap 𝜚𝑒𝑑 𝐺(?̃?𝑢𝑑) 𝑠𝑑 
𝑠𝑛 − 𝑠𝑑 
Search 
intensity 
gap 
Benchmark scenario:         
 0.240 0.559 0.101 0.226 0.311 −0.228 0.085 0.130 0.167 0.295 
Level of disability (dis=0.51)         
 0.174 0.625 0.085 0.243 0.392 −0.309 0.053 0.210 0.155 0.309 
Workers’ policy parameters         
𝛼𝑢 = 0.56 0.199 0.600 0.093 0.236 0.359 −0.276 0.067 0.178 0.162 0.303 
𝑝 = 0.031 0.310 0.489 0.117 0.212 0.247 −0.164 0.118 0.074 0.181 0.283 
Firms’policy parameters         
𝜁𝑒=0.22 0.268 0.531 0.103 0.226 0.311 −0.228 0.130 0.870 0.170 0.295 
𝜁𝑢= 0.228 0.247 0.552 0.108 0.221 0.315 −0.232 0.083 0.109 0.174 −0.291 
𝜉 = 0.26 0.331 0.469 0.120 0.209 0.231 −0.149 0.129 0.062 0.184 −0.280 
NOTE: The gaps measure the difference between nondisabled (n) and disabled individuals (d). 
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 The other workers’ policy parameters correspond to the income deduction for disabled 
workers, 𝑝. We next increase the net income deduction in one percentage point as a share of the 
disability wage (from 3 percent to 4 percent), which in monetary terms implies an increase from 
2,800 to 3,773 euros/year in the employment income used to calculate the income tax (the net tax 
deduction is equivalent to 146 euros/year). As a result, the disability employment rate increases 
from 24.0 percent to 31.0 percent, reducing the employment gap to 48.9 percentage points. 
Moreover, the job separation is reduced to 24.7 percent. Thus, with this extra tax deduction, 
disabled workers have the incentive to look for jobs with more intensity, which also reduces their 
reservation wage and therefore their productivity threshold, so fewer job positions are destroyed.  
 From the firms’ side, we first simulate what would happen if the lump-sum subsidy 
becomes operative not only when a firm hires a new disabled worker but also when it reallocates 
an employee that becomes partially disabled, 𝜁𝑒
𝑤𝑑
=0.28. In fact, this subsidy was operative until 
2001, when the law restricts it to certain contracts.12 Table 6 shows that this policy increases the 
job survival rate of newly disabled individuals from 0.085 to 0.087. However, the policy has a 
relatively small impact on the employment rate, increasing from 24.0 percent to 26.8 percent.  
 We next simulate the effects of an increase in the government’s lump-sum subsidy for 
newly hired disabled workers, 𝜁𝑢, from 3,900 to 4,041 euros, which represents an increase from 
28 percent to 29 percent of the average wage of disabled workers. In this case, the employment 
rate of disabled workers changes from 24 percent to 24.7 percent, due only to an increase in the 
job finding rate from 0.101 to 0.108. Thus, it becomes more attractive to hired disabled workers, 
although the effects are relatively small. At the same time, the job destruction rate increases from 
                                                 
12 In 2001 this lump-sum subsidy was not available for employment contracts to family membres, workers 
who had worked in the firm in the past 24 months with a permanent contract, and workers who had ended a 
permanent contract during the last 3 months.  
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31.1 percent to 31.5 percent, and the job survival rate inside the firm falls from 8.5 percent to 8.3 
percent.  
 When a firm’s deduction to Social Security contribution, 𝜉 , increases one percentage 
point as a proportion of disability wages, which means an increase from 4,500 to 4,680 euros in 
this deduction, the employment rate of disabled workers jumps from 24 percent to almost 33 
percent, due to both an increase in the job finding rate (from 0.101 to 0.120) and a reduction in 
the job separation rate (from 0.311 to 0.231). Notice that both lump-sum subsidies 𝜁𝑢  and 
𝜁𝑒  generate a relatively much lower impact in the employment rate than the Social Security 
contribution, 𝜉 , suggesting that firms are much more sensitive to the hiring incentives with 
permanent duration than to the transitory ones.  
 Overall, the simulated results show that both workers and firms are sensitive to the main 
policy parameters, especially when they remain operative under the different employment or job 
conditions. Thus, according to the model, the high employment gap observed between 
nondisabled and disabled workers can be explained in part by the design of the Spanish 
Disability System, which helps to generate a gap in the job search intensity as well as in the 
productivity thresholds between disabled and nondisabled workers. 
 Finally, in order to better understand the results obtained with our model, Table 7 shows 
how much three of the most sensitive policy parameters would need to change in order to close 
the employment gap between disabled and nondisabled individuals. We begin by asking how 
much the proportion of disability benefits would need to be reduced in order to get an almost 
negligible employment gap (six percentage points). Our model shows that benefits would need to 
be reduced from 55 percent to 35 percent of the regulatory base in order to achieve the objective 
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of a six percentage point employment gap. In this case, the disabled employment rate increases 
to 74 percent.  
 Similar results are obtained if we equalize the employment income used to calculate the 
income tax to the average gross wage earned by a disabled worker (16,668 euros/year), which 
implies an effective tax deduction of 2,500 euros/year in contrast to the actual 420 euros/year (𝑝 
increases from 0.023 to 0.137). Finally, the last row of Table 7 shows that by granting this extra 
tax deduction to the employer instead of the worker (extra tax deduction of 2,000 euros/year to 
the employer’s Social Security contribution), the employment gap would also be reduced to the 
minimal six percentage point level.  
 
Table  7  Modifying the Disability System to Close the Employment Rate Gap 
Scenario 𝑒𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑛 − 𝑒𝑟𝑑 𝑓𝑑 𝑓𝑛 − 𝑓𝑑 𝜓𝑑 𝜓𝑛 − 𝜓𝑑 𝜚𝑒𝑑 𝐺(?̃?𝑢𝑑) 𝑠𝑑 𝑠𝑛 − 𝑠𝑑 
Benchmark 
scenario:  
0.240 0.559 0.101 0.226 0.311 −0.228 0.085 0.130 0.167 0.295 
Workers’ policy parameters         
𝛼𝑢 = 0.35 0.742 0.059 0.230 0.103 0.082 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.328 0.139 
𝑝 = 0.137 0.739 0.063 0.226 0.108 0.082 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.145 
Firms policy parameters         
𝜉 = 0.361 0.737 0.064 0.224 0.110 0.082 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.318 0.147 
 
DISABILITY AND LABOR MARKET FLUCTUATIONS 
 To capture the business cycle response of disabled workers, we simulate the model 
presented above with an aggregate productivity shock, 𝐴𝑡, around the benchmark steady state of 
the model. Along this line, the logarithm of this variable follows an AR(1) process such that log(𝐴𝑡) = 𝜄 log(𝐴𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝑡 . The values of the autoregressive parameter and the standard 
deviation of the white noise process, 𝜄 = 0.85 and 𝜎𝜖 = 0.026, have been calibrated to match the 
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volatility (2.8 percent) and persistence (0.70) of the HP detrended Spanish GDP, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑛 +(1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠)𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑑 − 𝑐𝑣𝑡.  
 Figure 4 shows the response of the conditional mean of the labor market variables for 
disabled workers in response to the aggregate labor productivity shock. The disabled 
employment rate, 𝑒𝑟𝑑, is procyclical, increasing together with the GDP. This increase in 𝑒𝑟𝑑  takes 
place because both the job finding rate increases and the job separation rate falls after the 
positive productivity shock. The procyclical behavior of 𝑓𝑑  is due to the higher search 
intensity,  𝑠𝑑 . Thus, disabled workers are more willing to look for jobs during economic 
expansions. In turn, the increase in the aggregate labor productivity affects positively the firm’s 
surplus and, therefore, reduces the incentive to destroy job positions, reducing 𝜓𝑡𝑑 . Finally firms 
are also more willing to reallocate new disabled workers in a different job position, which in turn 
increases 𝜚𝑒𝑑.   
 Looking at the data, Table 8 shows that the employment rate, the job finding rate, and the 
job reallocation rate inside the firm are all positively correlated with the GDP. This result goes in 
line with the procyclical behavior of these rates shown by the simulated impulse response 
functions (Figure 4). Finally, we also observe in the data that the job destruction rate is 
negatively correlated with the GDP, which is in line with the countercyclical response observed 
in our simulated impulse response function. 
 In order to analyze whether business cycle conditions have a greater effect on disabled or 
nondisabled workers, in Figure 5 we simulate the effect of a business cycle shock on the relative 
employment rate of nondisabled and disabled workers, 𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑛
𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑑 . A negative response indicates a 
relatively higher impact of the shock in the employment of the latest group of workers, 
suggesting that disabled employees are more sensitive to labor market fluctuations than 
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nondisabled ones. Comparing Figures 1 and 5, it is not clear that a similar behavior can be 
observed in the data. More in detail, as Figure 1 shows, the employment rate of nondisabled 
workers increases by relatively more between 2001 and 2007, and decreases by much more 
during the current economic downturn (2008–2011).  Thus, the data suggest that 𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑛  seems to be 
more volatile than 𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑑  during labor market fluctuations.  
 We believe that an important part of the higher response observed in the employment 
rates of nondisabled workers in Spain can be explained by the higher incidence of the 
construction sector for nondisabled workers, which is a sector characterized by a higher share of 
temporary jobs. Therefore, as disabled workers do not have an important presence in the 
construction sector, their employment rates should be more stable. As we are unable to calculate 
employment rates by sector of activity with the administrative data, we cannot take this into 
account. Therefore, once the construction sector is omitted from data we should expect a relative 
increase in the business cycle response of the disabled employment rate as it is shown in the 
model’s simulations. 
 
Table 8  Labor Market Disability: Correlation with GDP (Spanish data 2001–2011) 
Variables Correlation with GDP 
𝑒𝑟
𝑑 0.859 
𝑓𝑑 0.878 
𝜓𝑑 −0.533 
𝜚𝑒
𝑑 0.578 
SOURCE: The Spanish Institute of Statistics and authors’ elaboration from the MCVL. 
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Figure 4 Labor market Disability and Impulse Response to a Labor Productivity Shock 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  Impulse Response of the Ratio of Nondisabled and Disabled Employment Rate to a Labor 
Productivity Shock 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 In Spain there are approximately 1 million disabled individuals receiving disability 
benefits; around half of them are partially disabled individuals who are allowed to combine the 
receipt of disability benefits with a job. The country reports, however, an average employment 
rate of just 11 percent for this group of people from 2001 to 2011, which is much lower than the 
employment rate of 80 percent observed for nondisabled employees. 
 In this paper we analyze the incentives and disincentives to work provided by the partial 
disability system in Spain. We first present a set of indicators that compare the Spanish labor 
market behavior for partially disabled and nondisabled individuals from 2001 to 2011. We find 
that for disabled workers the job finding rate is much lower than for non-disabled workers, while 
the job separation rate is higher. We also find that less than 20 percent of the employees who 
become partially disabled continue working in the same firm after the disabling condition.  
 In order to understand these labor market differences observed in the data, we construct a 
labor market model with search intensity and matching frictions that includes the interaction 
between disabled and nondisabled individuals in the labor market. Additionally, we also include 
in the model the hiring decisions made by companies and the incentives available in the 
legislation to hire disabled workers. We calibrate the model to match a number of stylized facts 
observed in the Spanish labor market. 
 In line with the data, our benchmark simulation shows the presence of an employment 
rate gap of 56 percentage points between nondisabled and disabled workers. The model also 
shows that the job finding rate for disabled workers is much lower while the job separation rate 
is higher than for nondisabled workers. An important part of the employment rate gap observed 
between nondisabled and disabled workers can be explained by the presence of a job search 
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intensity gap of 64 percent. These differences in the search intensity are due, in part, to the 
presence of a lower level of productivity, which, in turn, induces higher searching costs for 
disabled individuals discouraging them from looking for jobs. Moreover, our results show that 
the generosity of the Spanish Disability System also contributes to the presence of this search 
intensity gap between disabled and nondisabled individuals. More in detail, our model indicates 
that the level of disability benefits increases the employment opportunity costs for disabled 
workers and, therefore, reduces their job search intensity. 
 Our benchmark simulation shows that 87.0 percent of the times that the firm and the 
disabled worker meet, a new employment relationship is created. This result takes place due to 
presence of policy incentives for employers to hire disabled workers. In other words, the model 
suggests that firms are willing to hire disabled individuals. However, since disabled workers 
have a relatively high adjusted employment opportunity cost (due to both a lower level of 
productivity and the receipt of the benefits), they look for jobs with much less intensity and are 
separated from the job positions with higher frequency than nondisabled individuals.  
 In contrast to the strong motivation to hire disabled individuals because of the presence of 
incentives for employers, the model shows a much lower employer incentive to maintain their 
workers in the firm when they become disabled. According to the benchmark simulation, less 
than 10 percent of the employees who suffer a disabling condition are kept in the same firm. In 
this case, firms do not receive a lump-sum subsidy if they decide to keep the new disabled 
employee in the firm.   
 With respect to the type of policy initiatives that could be more effective in increasing 
both individual incentives to work as well as employer’s incentives to hire disabled workers, the 
sensitivity analysis shows that the employment rate gap can be considerably reduced to a six 
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percentage point level by modifying one of the following three parameters: 1) reducing the 
percentage of the regulatory base received by partially disabled individuals (from 55 to 35 
percent); 2) increasing the deductions to the Social Security contributions paid by the employer 
(by an extra deduction of 2,000 euros/year); or 3) increasing the tax deductions for disabled 
workers (by 2,500 euros/year). In contrast, the model shows that transitory lump-sum subsidies 
have a much lower impact in increasing the employment rate of disabled individuals.  
 Overall, the simulated results show that both workers and firms are sensitive to the main 
policy parameters, especially when they remain operative under the different employment or job 
conditions. Thus, according to the model, the high employment gap observed between disabled 
and nondisabled workers can be partly explained by the design of the Spanish Disability System, 
which helps to generate a gap in the job search behavior of disabled and nondisabled workers. 
 We believe these results to be important because, to the best of our knowledge, they are 
the first ones that provide a quantitative analysis of the explanations of the observed employment 
gap between disabled and nondisabled workers as well as an estimation of the potential costs that 
would be needed in order to achieve a reduction of this employment gap to a very low level. 
 Finally, we analyse the role of business cycle conditions in shaping the labor market 
transitions of disabled individuals and find that the employment rate, the job finding rate and the 
job survival rate in the same firm are positively correlated with the GDP. This result goes in line 
with the procyclical behavior of these rates shown by the data. Finally, the job destruction rate is 
negatively correlated with GDP, which is also in line with its empirical countercyclical response. 
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